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BOUMEDIENE V. BUSH: FLASHPOINT IN THE
ONGOING STRUGGLE TO DETERMINE THE RIGHTS
OF GUANTANAMO DETAINEES
Michael Anderson*

I. INTRODUCTION
Following the harrowing events of September 11, 2001, and pursuant to the
Authorization for Use of Military Force1 (AUMF) passed soon thereafter by Congress,
the United States Armed Forces began capturing and detaining individuals at the Naval
Air Base in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. The choice of where to house these detainees was
not random. Internal memoranda from the Justice Department reveal that the Naval
Base was selected as a means of avoiding any legal entanglements that might ensue
from such imprisonment.2 What resulted was what some commentators have called a
“legal black hole”3 at Guantanamo, a place where any individual meeting the
government’s vague definition of “enemy combatant”4 could be detained indefinitely
and, in many cases, without formal charges.
As news of these detentions started to become public, and the detainees
themselves began to initiate court proceedings to challenge the legality of their
detention, a lively interplay between the Executive, the Judiciary, and later, the
Legislature, began as a means of determining precisely what rights, if any, these

* J.D. Candidate, 2008, University of Maine School of Law.
1. Pub. L. No. 107-40, §§ 1-2, 115 Stat. 224 (2001). The AUMF states, in relevant part:
[T]he President is authorized to use all necessary and appropriate force against those
nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided
the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations
or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United
States by such nations, organizations or persons.
Id. § 2(a).
2. Memorandum from Patrick F. Philbin & John C. Yoo to William J. Haynes, II, Gen. Counsel, Dep’t
of Def. (Dec. 28, 2001), available at http://www.library.law.pace.edu/research/011228_philbinmemo.pdf
(“We conclude that the great weight of legal authority indicates that a federal district court could not
properly exercise habeas jurisdiction over an alien detained at GBC.”). See also JOHN YOO, WAR BY
OTHER MEANS: AN INSIDER’S ACCOUNT OF THE WAR ON TERROR 142 (2006) (“No location was perfect,
but the U.S. Naval Station at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, seemed to fit the bill. . . . [T]he federal courts
probably wouldn’t consider Gitmo as falling within their habeas jurisdiction . . . .”).
3. See Johan Steyn, Guantanamo Bay: The Legal Black Hole, 53 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 1 (2004);
Jonathan Hafetz, Habeas Corpus, Judicial Review, and Limits on Secrecy in Detentions at Guantanamo,
5 CARDOZO PUB. L., POL’Y & ETHICS J. 127, 128 (2006).
4. A 2004 memorandum from the Department of Defense defines “enemy combatant” as
[A]n individual who was part of or supporting Taliban or al Qaeda forces, or associated
forces that are engaged in hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners. This
includes any person who has committed a belligerent act or has directly supported hostilities
in aid of enemy armed forces.
Memorandum from Paul Wolfowitz, Deputy Sec’y of Def., to the Sec’y of the Navy (Jul. 7, 2004),
available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jul2004/d20040707review.pdf [hereinafter CSRT Order].
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detainees possessed. For its part, the Supreme Court, on several occasions, while
recognizing the valid role of Executive powers under such circumstances, defended the
rule of law and incrementally carved out legal protections for the detainees at
Guantanamo.5 Such protections have not been absolute, however, and Congress
recently entered the fray when it enacted the Military Commissions Act of 2006
(MCA),6 which purports to strip federal court jurisdiction over the habeas corpus
claims of the Guantanamo detainees.
The constitutionality of this legislation was considered by the Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia in the recent case of Boumediene v. Bush.7 The
Boumediene court determined that the Guantanamo detainees had no rights, either at
common law or under the Constitution, to federal habeas relief, and thus implicitly
affirmed the validity of the MCA.8 It is the purpose of this Note to suggest that in so
doing, the court foreclosed to the detainees any meaningful ability to challenge the
lawfulness of their detention, leaving only very narrow judicial review of their
continued status as “enemy combatants.”
In considering this issue, Part II of this Note examines the extensive
jurisprudential and legislative precedent to the Boumediene decision as a means of
analyzing the evolution of legal arguments and issues that culminated in the passage
of the MCA. Part III is devoted to a thorough analysis of the Boumediene opinion.
Part IV critiques the Boumediene majority and poses an argument that the Supreme
Court has, through its prior holdings, indicated that habeas rights do in fact extend to
these detainees. Based on the existence of these rights, Part IV continues by arguing
that the passage of the MCA was indeed an unconstitutional affront to the Suspension
Clause of the Constitution.9 This Note concludes by recommending that the Supreme
Court clarify its prior holdings and firmly establish the rights of the detainees held at
Guantanamo.10
II. BACKGROUND OF GUANTANAMO HABEAS LITIGATION
A. Habeas Corpus and the Suspension Clause
Habeas corpus enjoys a unique status in American history as the only common law
writ specifically mentioned in the Constitution.11 It was incorporated into American
colonial law after developing in England, where the first origins of the writ were
written into the Magna Carta, stating, “No free man shall be taken or imprisoned or
dispossessed or outlawed, or banished, or in any way destroyed, nor will we go upon

5. For a discussion of the Court’s decisions in Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004) and Hamdan v.
Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006), see Parts II.B, C of this Note.
6. Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600.
7. 476 F.3d 981 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
8. Id. at 988-92.
9. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2 (“The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended,
unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.”).
10. The Supreme Court granted a petition for writ of certiorari in Boumediene on June, 29, 2007,
reversing course from an earlier denial. Boumediene v. Bush, 127 S. Ct. 3078 (2007) (vacating
Boumediene v. Bush, 127 S. Ct. 1478 (2007)).
11. ROBERT SEARLES WALKER, HABEAS CORPUS: WRIT OF LIBERTY 104 (2006).
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him, nor send upon him, except by the legal judgment of his peers and by the law of
the land.”12 After codification by statute in England in 1679, the writ was included in
the United States Constitution through the Suspension Clause, which was, like so many
constitutional rights, a limitation on governmental action rather than a positive grant
of a specific right.13 The power to grant writs of habeas corpus was given to federal
courts upon their establishment by the Judiciary Act of 1789,14 and this power remains
a part our modern statutory scheme.15
As explained by Chief Justice John Marshall in an early habeas opinion, “The writ
of habeas corpus is a high prerogative writ, known to the common law, the great object
of which is the liberation of those who may be imprisoned without sufficient cause.
It is in the nature of a writ of error, to examine the legality of the commitment.”16 The
Supreme Court later defined the most important aspect of habeas as its ability “to
afford a swift and imperative remedy in all cases of illegal restraint upon personal
liberty.”17 Thus, at its most basic level, habeas corpus serves the crucial function of
ensuring that individuals confined by the government have a fair opportunity to
challenge the circumstances of their detention.
The Supreme Court has clearly articulated the important function of habeas in
securing personal freedom, particularly under circumstances of imprisonment at the
behest of the Executive branch. Indeed, the Court has stated that “[a]t its historical
core, the writ of habeas corpus has served as a means of reviewing the legality of
Executive detention, and it is in that context that its protections have been strongest.”18
Moreover, in the recent decision of Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,19 the Court clarified that
“unless Congress acts to suspend it, the Great Writ of habeas corpus allows the Judicial
Branch to play a necessary role in maintaining [a] delicate balance of governance,
serving as an important judicial check on the Executive’s discretion in the realm of
detentions.”20
The Suspension Clause commands that Congress cannot suspend the writ of
habeas “unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion, the public Safety may require
it.”21 Furthermore, an effective suspension of the writ can be made only through
“specific and unambiguous” statutory language.22 The habeas jurisprudence of the
Supreme Court, however, has indicated that Congress need not invoke the Suspension
Clause for every legislative alteration made to habeas relief. The Court held in Swain
v. Pressley23 that “the substitution of a collateral remedy which is neither inadequate
nor ineffective to test the legality of a person’s detention does not constitute a

12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

Id. at 8.
Id. at 104-05; see also supra note 9.
Ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. 73, 81-82.
See 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (2000).
Ex parte Watkins, 28 U.S. 193, 202 (1830).
Price v. Johnson, 334 U.S. 266, 283 (1948).
INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 (2001).
542 U.S. 507 (2004).
Id. at 536 (plurality opinion).
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 299.
430 U.S. 372 (1977).
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suspension of the writ of habeas corpus.”24 Thus, Congress is free to create an
“adequate” and “effective” substitute for habeas without running afoul of the
Constitution. These principles play an important role in the analysis of the habeas
petitions that have arisen out of Guantanamo Bay.
B. Origins of Guantanamo Habeas Petitions
The first habeas petitions arising out of detentions at Guantanamo were filed in the
United States District Court in the District of Columbia in 2002.25 Two separate
groups of detainees from the United Kingdom, Australia, and Kuwait brought claims
relating to their confinement at the naval base.26 One group directly sought a petition
for habeas corpus, while the other filed claims based on the Due Process Clause, the
Alien Tort Claims Act, and the Administrative Procedure Act. Interpreting all of these
claims as challenges to the lawfulness of the detainees’ confinement, the district court
consolidated the cases as petitions for writs of habeas corpus.27 The court granted the
government’s motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction,28 and the Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed,29 relying primarily on the Supreme Court’s
decision in Johnson v. Eisentrager.30
In Eisentrager, the Supreme Court considered the habeas petitions of twenty-one
German nationals who, after the surrender of Germany in World War II, were captured
by U.S. forces in China and tried and convicted there for violations of the laws of
war.31 Following their convictions, the petitioners were detained by the United States
in Germany.32 Justice Jackson, writing for the Eisentrager majority, noted that “[w]e
are cited to no instance where a court, in this or any other country where the writ [of
habeas corpus] is known, has issued it on behalf of an alien enemy who, at no relevant
time and in no stage of his captivity, has been within its territorial jurisdiction.”33 After
an extensive examination of aliens’ constitutional rights generally, and enemy aliens
specifically, Jackson concluded that “the privilege of litigation has been extended to
aliens, whether friendly or enemy, only because permitting their presence in the
country implied protection.”34 Jackson denied such protection to the German prisoners
because “at no relevant time were [they] within any territory over which the United
States is sovereign, and the scenes of their offense, their capture, their trial and their
punishment were all beyond the territorial jurisdiction of any court of the United

24. Id. at 381.
25. Rasul v. Bush, 215 F. Supp. 2d 55 (D.D.C. 2002), aff’d sub nom. Al Odah v. United States, 321
F.3d 1134, 1145 (D. C. Cir. 2003), rev’d, 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
26. Id. at 57-58.
27. Id. at 62-65.
28. Id. at 73.
29. Al Odah, 321 F.3d at 1145.
30. 339 U.S. 763 (1950).
31. Id. at 765-66. Specifically, the German soldiers were charged with furnishing intelligence regarding
the movement of American forces in China to the Japanese government. Id.
32. Id. at 766.
33. Id. at 768.
34. Id. at 777-78.
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States.”35 Any other solution, Jackson argued, would “hamper our war effort or aid the
enemy.”36
The court of appeals, in considering the Guantanamo detainees habeas petitions,
made much of the strict territorial analysis employed in Eisentrager. Initially, the
court acknowledged that the detainees differed in several aspects from the prisoners
in Eisentrager, specifically that they had been neither charged nor convicted of a
crime, denied their enemy alien status, and were not citizens of countries currently at
war with the United States.37 Nevertheless, the court considered these distinctions to
be of little consequence, finding that they in fact had “much in common” with the
Eisentrager petitioners, particularly that “they too were captured during military
operations, they were in a foreign country when captured, they are now abroad, they
are in the custody of the American military, and they have never had any presence in
the United States.”38 Holding that Eisentrager stands for the proposition that
“constitutional rights . . . are not held by aliens outside the sovereign territory of the
United States, regardless of whether they are enemy aliens,”39 the court concluded that
“no court in this country has jurisdiction to grant habeas relief [under the federal
habeas statute] to the Guantanamo detainees, even if they have not been adjudicated
enemies of the United States.”40
Importantly, in reaching this conclusion, the court disputed the detainees’
contention that Guantanamo Bay was, in effect, a territory of the United States and that
the government exercised sovereignty over it.41 The court reviewed both the text of the
leases between the United States and Cuba involving Guantanamo as well as federal
court decisions on the subject.42 Defining “sovereignty” as “supreme dominion
exercised by a nation,” the court held that this power lay with Cuba, not the United
States.43
The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals in Rasul v.
Bush.44 Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, began by noting that the federal
habeas statute45 “granted district courts, ‘within their respective jurisdictions,’ the
authority to hear applications for habeas corpus by any person who claims to be held
‘in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States,’”46
and asserted that, historically, habeas protections have been strongest when reviewing

35. Id. at 778.
36. Id.
37. Al Odah v. United States, 321 F.3d 1134, 1139-40 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
38. Id. at 1140.
39. Id. at 1140-41. The court considered two recent decisions of the Supreme Court interpreting
Eisentrager, including United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990) and Zadvydas v. Davis,
533 U.S. 678 (2001), in support of its assertion that “certain constitutional protections available to persons
inside the United States are unavailable to aliens outside of our geographic borders.” Al Odah, 321 F.3d
at 1141 (quoting Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 693).
40. Al Odah, 321 F.3d at 1141.
41. Id. at 1142-43.
42. Id. at 1143-44.
43. Id.
44. 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
45. 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (2000).
46. Rasul, 542 U.S. at 473 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2241).
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the legality of Executive detention.47 Stevens then undermined the lower court’s
reliance on Eisentrager, starting with the factual distinctions between the Guantanamo
detainees and the German prisoners that had been deemed unpersuasive by the court
of appeals:
[The Guantanamo detainees] are not nationals of countries at war with the United
States, and they deny that they have engaged in or plotted acts of aggression against
the United States; they have never been afforded access to any tribunal, much less
charged with and convicted of wrongdoing; and for more than two years they have
been imprisoned in territory over which the United States exercises exclusive
jurisdiction and control.48

Stevens stressed that the Eisentrager Court had placed much emphasis on the status of
the German prisoners, as admitted enemy aliens tried and convicted of crimes of war,
in determining that the right to habeas did not exist.49
In further reasoning why Eisentrager was not controlling in the case at bar,
Stevens indicated that the majority there focused almost exclusively on the prisoner’s
constitutional right to habeas while only briefly touching upon any statutory right that
may exist.50 Stevens asserted that the precedent relied on by the Eisentrager Court in
holding that statutory rights to habeas did not extend to the prisoners, namely the
Court’s decision two years earlier in Ahrens v. Clark,51 had since been overruled.52
Specifically, Stevens cited to Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of Kentucky,53
which reasoned that the “writ of habeas corpus does not act upon the prisoner who
seeks relief, but upon the person who holds him in what is alleged to be unlawful
custody,” and thus held that habeas may be granted in any situation where “the
custodian can be reached by service of process.”54 Stevens reasoned that because
Braden had undermined the “inflexible jurisdictional rule” set forth in Ahrens, then
Eisentrager, which had in turn relied on Ahrens, “plainly does not preclude the
exercise of [the federal habeas statute’s] jurisdiction over petitioners’ claims.”55
Stevens further departed from the court of appeals ruling by stating that the United
States “exercises complete jurisdiction and control” over Guantanamo and that such
control extended the reach of the federal habeas statute to its shores.56 Concluding that
“[p]etitioners contend that they are being held in federal custody in violation of the

47. Id. at 474 (citing INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 (2001)).
48. Id. at 476.
49. Id. at 475-76.
50. Id. at 476. Stevens quoted the only language devoted to statutory rights to habeas in Eisentrager:
“Nothing in the test of the Constitution extends such a right, nor does anything in our statutes.” Id.
(quoting Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 768 (1950)).
51. 335 U.S. 188 (1948). The Ahrens Court held that German immigrants detained at Ellis Island while
awaiting deportation had no right to habeas based on the “within their respective jurisdictions” language
of the federal habeas statute, and determined that the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, where
the habeas petitions had been filed, lacked territorial jurisdiction to entertain the detainees’ claims. Id. at
192.
52. Rasul, 542 U.S. at 476-79.
53. 410 U.S. 484 (1973).
54. Rasul, 542 U.S. at 478-79 (quoting Braden, 410 U.S. at 494-95).
55. Id. at 479.
56. Id. at 480-82.
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laws of the United States,” and that “[n]o party questions the District Court’s
jurisdiction over petitioners’ custodians,” Stevens asserted that the federal habeas
statute “confers on the District Court jurisdiction to hear petitioners’ habeas corpus
challenges to the legality of their detention at the Guantanamo Bay Naval Base.”57
While the holding of Rasul spoke directly only to the territorial reach of the
federal habeas statute, the Court suggested in a footnote that the detainees retained
rights beyond the statute itself:
Petitioners’ allegations—that, although they have engaged neither in combat nor in
acts of terrorism against the United States, they have been held in executive detention
for more than two years in territory subject to the long-term, exclusive jurisdiction
and control of the United States, without access to counsel and without being charged
with any wrongdoing—unquestionably describe “custody in violation of the
Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.”58

Such language suggests that the detainees’ right to habeas relief is rooted in more
fundamental due process rights guaranteed by the Constitution.59 Not surprisingly,
“footnote 15” has received much scrutiny as to its overall impact from courts60 as well
as commentators.61
Only nine days after the decision in Rasul was handed down, the Government
responded to the holding by establishing the Combatant Status Review Tribunal
(CSRT) as a means of allowing certain detainees at Guantanamo to challenge their
status as enemy combatants.62 The CSRT, comprised of “three neutral commissioned
officers of the U.S. Armed Forces,” does not allow the detainees access to counsel or
to all of the evidence against them.63 In making its determination, the CSRT considers
all “reasonably available” information as compiled by a “Recorder,” including “any
reasonably available records, determinations, or reports generated in connection” with
the initial holding of the detainee as an enemy combatant.64 Furthermore, the CSRT

57. Id. at 483-84.
58. Id. at 483 n.15 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3) (2000)) (emphasis added).
59. See Hafetz, supra note 3, at 139 (noting that footnote 15 of Rasul suggests that “the principal
constitutional right at issue in the Guantanamo detainee litigation—due process—is fundamental”).
60. See, e.g., In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d 443, 463 (D.D.C. 2005) (“[I]t is
difficult to imagine that the Justices would have remarked that the petitions ‘unquestionably describe
“custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States”’ unless they considered
the [detainees] to be within a territory in which constitutional rights are guaranteed.”). For a more thorough
discussion of this district court opinion, see infra Part II.C.
61. See, e.g., Hafetz, supra note 3, at 139; Elizabeth A. Wilson, The War on Terrorism and “The
Water’s Edge”: Sovereignty, “Territorial Jurisdiction,” and the Reach of the U.S. Constitution in the
Guantanamo Detainee Litigation, 8 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 165, 171 (2006). For a more detailed discussion
of the impact of footnote 15 on analysis of habeas claims originating out of Guantanamo see infra Part
IV.A.
62. CSRT Order, supra note 4.
63. Id. at 1. As opposed to legal counsel, the detainees were appointed a “military officer, with the
appropriate security clearance, as a personal representative for the purpose of assisting the detainee in
connection with the review process described herein.” Id. The personal representative is permitted to
review relevant evidence and share information with the detainee with the exception of any classified
information against him. Id.
64. Id. at 2.
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is not bound by the Federal Rules of Evidence and can consider “any information [that]
it deems relevant and helpful to a resolution of the issue before it.”65
C. Procedural History of Boumediene
In the wake of the Supreme Court’s recognition of jurisdiction over detainees’
habeas claims in Rasul, two separate sets of claims made their way to the United States
District Court, District of Columbia, each producing drastically different results. In
Khalid v. Bush,66 Judge Leon dismissed the habeas petitions of seven Guantanamo
detainees, holding that “no viable legal theory exists by which it could issue a writ of
habeas corpus under these circumstances.”67 The petitioners in Khalid challenged both
the Executive authority to order their detention and, if such authority was legal,
challenged the lawfulness of their detention under the Constitution, the laws of the
United States, and international law.68 In addressing the first argument, the court found
the appropriate Executive authority under the AUMF, passed immediately following
the events of 9/11.69
Turning next to the constitutional arguments, Judge Leon relied heavily on
Eisentrager and its progeny, reaffirming the Supreme Court’s “unequivocal and
repeated denial” of substantive constitutional rights to non-resident aliens.70 The court
indicated that Rasul did not alter Eisentrager but rather “limited its inquiry to whether
non-resident aliens detained at Guantanamo have a right to judicial review of the
legality of their detention under the habeas statute” and “did not concern itself with
whether the petitioners had any independent constitutional rights.”71 In addressing the
brief suggestion in Rasul that the detainees may indeed possess fundamental rights
under the Constitution,72 Judge Leon asserted that such language must be read in the
context of the Rasul Court’s limitation of its holding to jurisdictional grounds.73 After
finding no domestic or international law upon which to base the petitioners’ claims,74
the court granted the government’s motion to dismiss.75
Twelve days after the district court issued its opinion in Khalid, the very same
court issued a strikingly contrasting decision on similar facts in In re Guantanamo
Detainee Cases.76 There, Judge Joyce Hens Green considered the government’s
motion to dismiss the habeas petitions filed by detainees in eleven consolidated cases.77

65. Id. at 3.
66. 355 F. Supp. 2d 311 (D.D.C. 2005), aff’d sub nom. Boumediene v. Bush, 476 F.3d 981 (D.C. Cir.
2007).
67. Id. at 314.
68. Id. at 316.
69. Id. at 317-20.
70. Id. at 320-21.
71. Id. at 322 (citing Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 475-76 (2004)).
72. See supra notes 58-61 and accompanying text.
73. Khalid, 355 F. Supp. 2d at 323 (“[I]n its own words, the Supreme Court chose to only answer the
question of jurisdiction, and not the question of whether these same individuals possess any substantive
rights on the merits of their claims.”).
74. Id. at 324-28.
75. Id. at 330.
76. 355 F. Supp. 2d 443 (D.C. Cir. 2005), rev’d sub nom. Boumediene v. Bush, 476 F.3d 981 (D.C.
Cir. 2007).
77. Id. at 452.

244

MAINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 60:1

As in Khalid, all of the detainees alleged that their detention constituted violations of
rights guaranteed under the Fifth Amendment, while asserting a variety of other claims
based on federal and international law.78 The government again argued that Rasul
determined only that the detainees had a right to allege detention in violation of the
Constitution and other laws, but was silent as to whether they possessed any
“underlying substantive rights.”79 The government further asserted that Supreme Court
precedent prior to Rasul firmly established that no such rights existed as to nonresident aliens.80
Judge Green rejected these arguments, interpreting Rasul, “in conjunction with
other precedent, to require the recognition that the detainees at Guantanamo Bay
possess enforceable constitutional rights.”81 In support of that interpretation, Judge
Green first noted that the Court in Rasul had expressly recognized that Guantanamo
was a territory “over which the United States exercises exclusive jurisdiction and
control”82 and concluded that such language by itself “would be sufficient for this
Court to recognize the special nature of the Guantanamo Bay and . . . treat it as the
equivalent of sovereign U.S. territory where fundamental constitutional rights exist.”83
Rather than ending the analysis there, however, the court gave significant weight to the
Rasul Court’s recognition in footnote 15 that the detention of the detainees was
unquestionably “in violation of the Constitution . . . of the United States.”84
Upon concluding that the detainees possessed fundamental due process rights
under the Constitution as a result of their detention at Guantanamo, Judge Green went
on to hold that the CSRT procedures established by the government in response to
Rasul did not satisfy these rights.85 The court specifically cited the failure to provide
the detainees access to material evidence, denial of assistance of counsel, reliance on
information obtained through torture, and an overly broad definition of “enemy
combatant” as specific defects in the CSRT procedures.86
D. Legislative Precedent to Boumediene
While the appeals of both Khalid and In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases were
pending in the United States Circuit Court, District of Columbia Circuit, two pieces of
legislation were passed by Congress that would dramatically affect the detainees’
habeas claims. First, Congress passed the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 (DTA).87
The DTA amended the federal habeas statute by adding a subsection (e) to 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241.88 This new subsection provided that “[e]xcept as provided in section 1005 of
the [DTA], no court, justice, or judge shall have jurisdiction to hear or consider”:

78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

Id. at 452-53.
Id. at 454.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 462 (quoting Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 476 (2004)).
Id. at 462-63.
Id. at 463 (quoting Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 483 n.15 (2004)).
Id. at 472.
See id. at 468-78.
Pub. L. No. 109-148, §§ 1001-06, 119 Stat. 2680, 2739-45.
Id. § 1005(e)(1).
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(1) an application for a writ of habeas corpus filed by or on behalf of an alien detained
by the Department of Defense at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba; or
(2) any other action against the United States or its agents relating to any aspect of the
detention by the Department of Defense of an alien at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, who
(A) is currently in military custody; or
(B) has been determined by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit in accordance with the procedures set forth in section 1005(e) of
the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 to have been properly detained as an enemy
combatant.89

The “except as provided” language referred to subsections (e)(2) and (e)(3) of section
1005 of the DTA, which granted limited review to the D.C. Circuit over CSRT
determinations and final military commission decisions.90 The DTA specifically
indicated that subsections (e)(2) and (e)(3) “shall apply with respect to any claim . . .
that is pending on or after the date of the enactment of this Act.”91
The jurisdiction stripping language of the DTA was challenged in the Supreme
Court in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld.92 In Hamdan, the government moved to dismiss the
habeas claim of a Yemeni national detained at Guantanamo, claiming that the recently
enacted DTA applied retroactively to all habeas claims pending at the time of its
passage.93 In rejecting this argument, the Court noted that the retroactivity provision
of the DTA, by its terms, only included subsections (e)(2) and (e)(3), noticeably
excluding subsection (e)(1) (dealing with habeas claims),94 and held that “a negative
inference may be drawn from the exclusion of language from one statutory provision
that is included in other provisions of the same statute.”95 The Court, in addressing the
merits of Hamdan’s challenge, held the Executive branch lacked “specific
congressional authorization” to convene the military commission that was to try him.96
In invalidating the commission, the Court found that its procedures violated both the
Uniform Code of Military Justice97 and the Geneva Conventions.98
In a rapid response to the Hamdan decision, Congress passed the MCA. Section
7 of the MCA struck the amendment to subsection (e) of the federal habeas statute
made by the DTA and inserted new language:

89. Id.
90. Id. §§ 1005(e)(2), (3). The DTA limits review of any CSRT determination to whether such determination “was consistent with the standards and procedures specified by the Secretary of Defense,” including “the requirement that the conclusion of the Tribunal be supported by a preponderance of the evidence
and allowing a rebuttable presumption in favor of the Government’s evidence.” Id. § 1005(e)(2)(C)(i). In
addition, the reviewing court may consider, “to the extent the Constitution and laws of the United States
are applicable, whether the use of such standards and procedures to make the determination is consistent
with the Constitution and laws of the United States.” Id. § 1005(e)(2)(C)(ii). The DTA offers similar
review for final decisions of military commissions. See id. § 1005(e)(3).
91. Id. § 1005(h)(2).
92. 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006).
93. Id. at 2752-53.
94. Id. at 2763; see supra notes 87-90 and accompanying text.
95. Id. at 2765 (citing Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 330 (1997)).
96. Id. at 2775.
97. Id. at 2787-93.
98. Id. at 2794-96.
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(1) No court, justice, or judge shall have jurisdiction to hear or consider an
application for a writ of habeas corpus filed by or on behalf of an alien detained by
the United States who has been determined by the United States to have been properly
detained as an enemy combatant or is awaiting such determination.
(2) Except as provided in paragraphs (2) and (3) of section 1005(e) of the Detainee
Treatment Act of 2005, no court, justice, or judge shall have jurisdiction to hear or
consider any other action against the United States or its agents relating to any aspect
of the detention, transfer, treatment, trial, or conditions of confinement of an alien
who is or was detained by the United States and has been determined by the United
States to have been properly detained as an enemy combatant or is awaiting such
determination.99

Furthermore, the Act established that the amendment “shall apply to all cases, without
exception, pending on or after the date of the enactment of this Act which relate to any
aspect of the detention, transfer, treatment, trial, or conditions of detention of an alien
detained by the United States since September 11, 2001.”100 Thus, the MCA
broadened the limited retroactivity of the DTA as interpreted by the Hamdan Court
and removed federal court jurisdiction from all pending habeas petitions of the
Guantanamo detainees. After five years in imprisonment, in many cases without any
formal charges, Congress had effectively slammed the courthouse doors shut on
hundreds of prisoners held at the naval base.
III. THE BOUMEDIENE DECISION
By the time the MCA was enacted, the pending appeals from the conflicting
district court decisions in Khalid and In Re Guantanamo Detainees had been
consolidated and all parties had filed briefs in reaction to the legislation.101 The
detainees advanced two principal arguments that the MCA did not impede their ability
to file a habeas writ in federal court: first, that the MCA, by its terms, did not repeal
jurisdiction over the pending habeas claims102 and, second, that to the extent that it
succeeded in stripping district court jurisdiction over the pending habeas claims, it
violated the Suspension Clause of the U.S. Constitution.103 The Government, in turn,
argued that the MCA expressly eliminated district court jurisdiction over the detainees’
claims.104
Noting initially that “Congress must articulate specific and unambiguous statutory
directives to effect a repeal” of habeas corpus,105 the detainees relied on statutory

99. Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, § 7(a), 120 Stat. 2600, 2636.
100. Id. § 7(b) (emphasis added).
101. See Supplemental Brief of Petitioners Boumediene, et al., and Khalid Regarding the Military
Commissions Act of 2006, Boumediene v. Bush, 476 F.3d 981 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (Nos. 05-5062 & 05-5063),
[hereinafter Boumediene Brief]; The Guantanamo Detainees’ Supplemental Brief Addressing the Military
Commissions Act of 2006, 476 F.3d 981 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (Nos. 05-5095 through 5116), [hereinafter
Guantanamo Detainees Brief]; Government’s Supplemental Brief Addressing the Military Commissions
Act, 476 F.3d 981 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (Nos. 05-5062 through 05-5116), [hereinafter Government Brief].
102. Boumediene Brief, supra note 101, at 3-6.
103. Id. at 6-20.
104. Government Brief, supra note 101, at 4-12.
105. Boumediene Brief, supra note 101, at 3 (quoting INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 299 (2001)).
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construction to assert that the MCA, like the DTA before it, did not apply retroactively
to habeas petitions.106 Specifically, the detainees referred to section 7(a) of the MCA,
which strips jurisdiction over two distinct categories of cases, habeas claims and the
broader category “any other action . . . relating to any aspect of the detention, transfer,
treatment, trial, or conditions of confinement.”107 In contrast, the detainees noted that
the retroactivity clause of the MCA applied specifically to cases “which relate to any
aspect of the detention, transfer, treatment, trial, or conditions of detention.”108 Thus,
much like the “negative inference” drawn by the Hamdan Court in construing the
DTA, the detainees argued that the MCA similarly failed to apply retroactively to
pending habeas claims.109
In support of their argument that the MCA, if construed to strip federal courts of
habeas jurisdiction, violated the Suspension Clause, the detainees initially asserted that
their right to habeas was protected by the Constitution.110 Noting that Supreme Court
precedent established that “at the absolute minimum, the Suspension Clause protects
the writ [of habeas] ‘as it existed in 1789,’”111 the detainees interpreted Rasul as
establishing that similarly situated prisoners would have possessed such a right at
common law from the time of the signing of the Constitution.112 Thus, as an initial
matter, the detainees argued that the MCA denied them a constitutionally guaranteed
right to habeas.113
After arguing for entitlement to habeas, the detainees asserted that Supreme Court
precedent established that Congress cannot suspend the writ in accordance with the
Suspension Clause without allowing for an adequate substitute remedy.114 The
detainees argued that the proper test for determining whether such an alternative was
adequate hinged upon whether the substitute remedy was both commensurate in scope
with habeas and an adequate and effective means of testing the legality of the detention
at issue.115 Noting that judicial review under the DTA was the only substitute for
habeas provided by Congress in the wake of the MCA,116 the detainees asserted that
such review fell well short of the scope and rigor of protections offered by habeas
corpus.117 In particular, the detainees argued that, historically, habeas required a
particularly “searching” review when the claim involved, as here, Executive
detention.118

106. Id. at 3-6.
107. Id. at 3-4.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 5-6.
110. Guantanamo Detainees Brief, supra note 101, at 6-7.
111. Id. (quoting INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 (2001)).
112. Id. In support of this point, the detainees cited a portion of Rasul in which Justice Stevens engages
in a brief discussion of the history of the writ, and concludes that “[a]pplication of the habeas statute to
persons detained at [Guantanamo] is consistent with the historical reach of the writ of habeas corpus.”
Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 481 (2004).
113. Guantanamo Detainees Brief, supra note 101, at 6-7.
114. Id. at 7-9 (citing Swain v. Pressley, 430 U.S. 372 (1977)).
115. Id.
116. Id. at 10. For a discussion of the judicial review provided by the DTA see infra notes 175-82 and
accompanying text.
117. Id. at 10-12.
118. Id. at 12-18.
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In response, the Government argued that the language of the MCA was
unequivocal in its intent to strip federal court jurisdiction over pending habeas claims
originating out of Guantanamo.119 Specifically, the Government argued that the
application of the retroactivity clause of the Act to “all cases, without exception . . .
which relate to any aspect of the detention” of those held at Guantanamo implicitly
included habeas claims within its scope.120 In countering the detainees claim that the
MCA violated the Suspension Clause, the Government asserted that Eisentrager
expressly held that aliens detained as enemies outside of the United States were not
entitled to habeas relief.121 Furthermore, the Government distinguished Rasul, limiting
that holding to a determination of a statutory right to habeas, a right that had been
expressly revoked by the MCA.122
In Boumediene, a divided three judge panel of the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit dismissed the detainees’ petitions for habeas corpus based
on lack of jurisdiction.123 At the outset, the court accepted the government’s argument
that habeas claims invariably were “aspects of detention” and thus fell within the ambit
of the MCA’s retroactivity clause.124 Finding no ambiguity in the Congressional intent
to revoke federal court jurisdiction over the habeas claims, the court turned to the
constitutional issues.
Noting that the Suspension Clause protected the writ “as it existed in 1789,” the
court engaged in a lengthy historical analysis in an attempt to determine the scope of
the writ in relation to the detainees.125 The court examined the 18th century English
cases proffered by the detainees and, after determining that none of them “involved an
alien outside the territory of the sovereign,” concluded that “[the detainees] cite no
case and no historical treatise showing that the English common law writ of habeas
corpus extended to aliens beyond the Crown’s dominions.”126 Citing its own historical
precedent, the court asserted that not only did the writ not extend outside of England’s
borders, but that government actors took full advantage of that reality in choosing
where to detain prisoners.127 The court concluded that “given the history of the writ
in England prior to the founding, habeas corpus would not have been available in 1789
to aliens without presence or property within the United States.”128
The majority bolstered its argument by relying heavily on Eisentrager, stating that
the holding of that case “ends any doubt about the scope of common law habeas.”129
Furthermore, the court looked to Eisentrager in foreclosing any constitutional rights

119. Government Brief, supra note 101, at 4.
120. Id. at 6-7. The Government also urged a contextual argument that stressed that it would be
nonsensical to conclude that, in the wake of the Court’s holding in Hamdan, Congress would pass
legislation that was, in relation to habeas jurisdiction, redundant of the DTA. Id. at 8-10.
121. Id. at 14 n.7.
122. Id. at 15 n.8.
123. Boumediene v. Bush, 476 F.3d 981, 994 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
124. Id. at 986-91.
125. Id. at 988 (quoting INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 (2001)).
126. Id. at 989.
127. Id. (“When agents of the Crown detained prisoners outside the Crown’s dominions, it was
understood that they were outside the jurisdiction of the writ.”).
128. Id. at 990.
129. Id.
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that might extend to the detainees, interpreting that case to stand for the proposition
that “the Constitution does not confer rights on aliens without property or presence
within the United States.”130 Thus, on the basis of Eisentrager’s strict territorial rule,
the court concluded that there was no Suspension Clause violation and, in light of the
clear language of the MCA, no federal court could properly hear the detainees’ habeas
claims.131
In a sharply written dissent, Judge Rogers agreed with the majority that that the
text of the MCA was clear in its intent to withdraw federal jurisdiction from the
detainees’ claims, but departed with regard to whether that withdrawal withstood
scrutiny under the Suspension Clause.132 The dissent argued that the Suspension
Clause operated as a limitation on congressional power and not a grant of individual
constitutional rights, 133 thus eliminating the need to inquire into the actual status or
location of the detainees in regard to the sovereign authority of the United States.134
Based on that assumption, Judge Rogers criticized the majority’s emphasis on the
historical reach of the writ. Furthermore, the dissent took the majority to task for
“ignoring the Supreme Court’s well-considered and binding dictum in [Rasul], that the
writ at common law would have extended to the detainees.”135
After concluding that the writ would have extended to the detainees at common
law and was thus protected by the Suspension Clause, Judge Rogers noted that
Congress had not invoked its power to suspend the writ under the exception laid out
in the Constitution, namely “in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion.”136 Thus, the dissent
concluded, under Supreme Court precedent, suspension of the writ was unconstitutional absent an “adequate alternative procedure for challenging detention.”137 Judge
Rogers found the CSRT review provided by the DTA, the only substitute offered by
Congress in the wake of revoking habeas jurisdiction, “neither adequate to test whether
detention is unlawful nor directed toward releasing those who are unlawfully held.”138
Specifically, Judge Rogers considered the detainees’ inability to present evidence, the
highly deferential review required under the DTA, and the availability of evidence
acquired through torture.139 Judge Rogers argued that all of these conditions fell well
short of the relief provided under habeas.140 In addition, the dissent pointed out that
while the traditional remedy to unlawful detention under a habeas petition was release,

130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

Id.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

Id. at 991-94.
Id. at 993.
Id. at 994-95.
Id.
Id. at 1004. Judge Rogers noted:
The detainees do not here contend that the Constitution accords them a positive right to the
writ but rather that the Suspension Clause restricts Congress’s power to eliminate a
preexisting statutory right. To answer that question does not entail looking to the extent of
the detainees’ ties to the United States but rather requires understanding the scope of the
writ of habeas corpus at common law in 1789.
Id. at 995.
Id. at 1007 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2).
Id. at 1004.
Id. at 1005.
Id. at 1006.
Id. at 1005.
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neither the DTA nor the MTA required release, and noted that detainees previously
found not to be enemy combatants under the CSRT were merely subjected to
additional CSRT proceedings.141
Judge Rogers continued her dissent by asserting that “the Court in Rasul held that
federal court jurisdiction under [the federal habeas statute] is permitted for habeas
petitions filed by detainees at Guantanamo, and this result is undisturbed because the
MCA is void.”142 Relying heavily on the traditional reach and purpose of the writ, the
dissent noted that “[s]o long as the Executive can convince an independent Article III
habeas judge that it has not acted unlawfully, it may continue to detain those alien
enemy combatants who pose a continuing threat during the active engagement of the
United States in the war on terror.”143 However, the judge concluded that the current
conditions under the DTA and the MCA required no such showing and, perhaps most
importantly, gave the detainees no opportunity to respond to the charges against
them.144 Such conditions, according to Judge Rogers, amounted to an unconstitutional
suspension of the writ of habeas corpus.145
IV. MISSED SIGNALS AND MISSED OPPORTUNITIES:
A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF BOUMEDIENE
After initially denying a petition for certiorari in Boumediene,146 in June of 2007
the Supreme Court made a rare reversal of course and agreed to hear the case.147 The
Court thus has an opportunity to correct the grave errors of the D.C. circuit majority
in Boumediene and grant to the Guantanamo detainees the right to meaningfully
challenge their confinement. The Court should, as an initial matter, overturn the court
of appeals and clarify its previous holdings suggesting that the right to habeas corpus
is indeed available to the detainees. Having thus established a right to the writ, the
Court should then address whether the review offered by the MCA and DTA provides
an adequate substitute or if these statutory schemes in fact serve as an unconstitutional
suspension of habeas corpus.
A. Rasul and the Writ: A Proper Reading of Supreme Court Precedent
The Supreme Court has held that “at the absolute minimum, the Suspension Clause
protects the writ [of habeas corpus] ‘as it existed in 1789.’”148 While both the majority

141. Id. at 1006.
142. Id. at 1011 (citations omitted).
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 1011-12.
146. Boumediene v. Bush, 127 S. Ct. 1478 (2007).
147. Boumediene v. Bush, 127 S. Ct. 3078 (2007). The impact of the grant of certiorari was
immediately felt, as some district courts denied the government’s motions to dismiss in pending detainee
habeas claims, recognizing that the Court would likely resolve issues highly relevant to those cases. See,
e.g., Al Maqaleh v. Gates, No. 06-1669 (JDB), 2007 WL 2059128 (D.D.C. Jul. 18, 2007). But see Qayed
v. Bush, No. 05-0454 (RMU) (D.D.C. Sep. 20, 2007), available at http://www.scotusblog.com/
movabletype/archives/Urbina%20order%20Sept.%2020%2007.pdf (dismissing petitioner’s claim without
prejudice based on the court of appeals’ decision in Boumediene).
148. INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 (2001) (quoting Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 663-64 (1996)).
While the Court in St. Cyr did not reach the question of whether the Suspension Clause encompassed
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and the dissent in Boumediene engaged in lengthy historical analyses of the reach of
the writ, any such exercise was rendered immaterial by the language of the Rasul
Court. Although the majority in Rasul clarified that the question before them was
limited to whether the federal habeas statute conferred jurisdiction over habeas claims
coming from Guantanamo,149 the Court’s subsequent analysis established a common
law right to the writ as well. In its searching historical survey, the Court stated that the
“[a]pplication of the habeas statute to persons detained at the base is consistent with
the historical reach of the writ of habeas corpus.”150 The Court further explained that
“[a]t common law, courts exercised habeas jurisdiction over the claims of aliens
detained within sovereign territory of the realm, as well as the claims of persons
detained in the so-called ‘exempt jurisdictions,’ where ordinary writs did not run, and
all other dominions under the sovereign’s control.”151 Such language expressly refutes
the Boumediene majority’s reasoning that “habeas corpus would not have been
available in 1789 to aliens without presence or property within the United States.”152
Furthermore, the Rasul decision seriously undermines the significant reliance that
the court in Boumediene placed on the strict territoriality rule expressed in
Eisentrager.153 The Court in Rasul expressly stated that the detainees there “differ
from the Eisentrager detainees in important respects,” including the fact that “they
have been imprisoned in territory over which the United States exercises exclusive
jurisdiction and control.”154 Justice Kennedy, concurring in the majority opinion, noted
that “Guantanamo Bay is in every practical respect a United States territory.”155 On
that basis, the Court, rather than overruling Eisentrager, simply distinguished it and

subsequent expansions of the writ, it has been suggested that its reach must have been intended by the
Framers to reach future developments. See Developments in the Law—Federal Habeas Corpus, 83 HARV.
L. REV. 1038, 1269 (1970) (“While the framers probably could not have foreseen the extent to which the
writ’s function would expand, the history of two centuries of expansion through a combination of statutory
and judicial innovation in England must have led them to understand habeas corpus as an inherently elastic
concept not bound to its 1789 form. The suspension clause then could be read to protect the product of an
evolving judicial process.”) (citations omitted).
149. See Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 475 (2004).
150. Id. at 481.
151. Id. at 481-82 (footnotes omitted).
152. Boumediene v. Bush, 476 F.3d 981, 990 (D.C. Cir. 2007). The Court of Appeal’s overt rejection
of the majority’s historical analysis is all the more surprising given the fact that, in coming to its own
conclusions regarding the historical reach of the writ, the court placed emphasis on Justice Scalia’s
dissenting opinion in Rasul. Id. at 990-91 (citing Rasul, 542 U.S. at 502-05, n.5 (Scalia, J., dissenting)).
This is particularly troubling considering that the Rasul majority expressly refused to follow Scalia’s
historical analysis. Rasul, 542 U.S. at 482-83 n.14; see also Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 16,
Boumediene v. Bush, 127 S.Ct. 1478 (2007) (No. 06-1195).
153. The Boumediene court stated that Eisentrager “end[ed] any doubt about the scope of common law
habeas.” Boumediene, 476 F.3d at 990. In applying Eisentrager’s strict territoriality rule, the court then
asserted that “under the common law [of habeas corpus], the dispositive fact was . . . [the petitioner’s] lack
of presence within any sovereign territory.” Id. at n.8.
154. Rasul, 542 U.S. at 476.
155. Id. at 487 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy’s concurrence further provides a detailed
explanation as to why a “faithful application” of Eisentrager “requires an initial inquiry into the general
circumstances of the detention to determine whether the Court has the authority to entertain the petition and
to grant relief after considering all of the facts presented.” Id. Kennedy considered the fact that the
detainees were being “held indefinitely, and without benefit of any legal proceeding,” compelled an
application of the privilege of habeas to the detainees. Id. at 487-88.
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rendered it inapplicable to the Guantanamo detainees, asserting that “the reach of the
writ depend[s] not on formal notions of territorial sovereignty, but rather on the
practical question of ‘the exact extent and nature of the jurisdiction or dominion
exercised in fact by the Crown.’”156 Based on this reasoning by the Rasul Court, the
Boumediene majority’s reliance on Eisentrager and its formal notions of a strict
sovereignty rule was misguided.
The majority in Rasul offered additional evidence of its support for the proposition
that the protection of the writ of habeas extended to the detainees at Guantanamo in its
well-documented “footnote 15.”157 While hardly explicit,158 the majority suggested in
this footnote that such protections may flow from the Constitution itself:
Petitioners’ allegations—that, although they have engaged neither in combat nor in
acts of terrorism against the United States, they have been held in executive detention
for more than two years in territory subject to the long-term, exclusive jurisdiction
and control of the United States, without access to counsel and without being charged
with any wrongdoing—unquestionably describe “custody in violation of the
Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.”159

The footnote supports this conclusion by citing to Justice Kennedy’s concurring
opinion in United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez160 and cases cited therein, a fact that may
be of considerable significance.
In Verdugo-Urquidez, the Court considered a Fourth Amendment challenge by a
Mexican citizen when U.S. Drug Enforcement Agents searched his home in Mexico
and seized evidence pertinent to his trial.161 The majority held that the Fourth
Amendment had no application to the search performed in Mexico, as the petitioner
was a “citizen and resident of Mexico with no voluntary attachment to the United
States.”162 Crucial to the majority analysis was the ability of the government to
“function effectively in the company of sovereign nations.”163 In concurrence, Justice
Kennedy accepted the majority’s reasoning that the Fourth Amendment would not
apply under the specific facts before the Court,164 but refused to adopt any bright-line
rule of strict territoriality when considering the application of the Constitution
overseas.165 Rather, Kennedy espoused a context specific analysis that would

156. Id. at 482 (quoting Ex parte Mwenya, 1 Q.B. 241, 303 (1960)).
157. Id. at 483 n.15.
158. Judge Green, relying on footnote 15 while ruling for the detainees in the district court below, wrote
that she “would have welcomed a clearer declaration in the Rasul opinion regarding the specific
constitutional and other substantive rights of the petitioners,” but that she nevertheless interpreted the
opinion “to require the recognition that the detainees at Guantanamo Bay possess enforceable constitutional
rights.” In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d 443, 454 (D.D.C. 2005).
159. Rasul, 542 U.S. at 483 n.15 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3) (2000)) (emphasis added).
160. 494 U.S. 259, 275-78 (1990) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
161. Id. at 262-63 (majority opinion).
162. Id. at 274-75.
163. Id. at 275 (quoting Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44 (1958)).
164. Id. at 278 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy gave several reasons why the Fourth
Amendment would not apply in Verdugo-Urquidez, including “[t]he absence of local judges or magistrates
available to issue warrants, the differing and perhaps unascertainable concepts of reasonableness and
privacy that prevail abroad, and the need to cooperate with foreign officials.” Id. It is worth noting that,
arguably, none of these elements are applicable to the current situation in Guantanamo Bay.
165. Id. at 277-78 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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“interpret constitutional protections in light of the undoubted power of the United
States to take actions to assert its legitimate power and authority abroad.”166
The fact that the Rasul majority, in supporting its statement that the detainees’
circumstances “unquestionably describe[s] custody in violation of the Constitution or
laws or treaties of the United States,”167 cited not to the strict territorial approach of the
majority in Verdugo-Urquidez, but rather to Kennedy’s contextual approach in
concurrence (including his reliance on the Insular Cases), suggests that the Court may
indeed be willing to apply fundamental constitutional protections, including Due
Process, to the Guantanamo detainees.168 Indeed, one of the two district court
decisions that were ultimately reviewed by the court of appeals in Boumediene applied
that precise analysis.169
Thus, the holding of the Boumediene court seems to be in conflict with the
Supreme Court holding in Rasul. The court’s application of Eisentrager to the
Guantanamo detainees stands in sharp contrast to both the clear language of the Rasul
majority (indicating that a common law right to habeas would have extended to
similarly situated prisoners in 1789), and the suggestion that the Court was willing to
endorse the contextual approach of Justice Kennedy in Verdugo-Urquidez, as opposed
to the strict territoriality rule expressed in Eisentrager. By failing to consider the
specific circumstances of the detainees confinement, most importantly that they, in the
words of the Rasul majority, “have been imprisoned in territory over which the United
States exercises exclusive jurisdiction and control,”170 the Boumediene court erred in
failing to extend to them either common law or constitutional habeas protection.
B. Suspension of the Writ
Because the majority in Boumediene held, albeit erroneously, that the detainees
before them had no common law or constitutional right to habeas corpus, the court did
not reach the question of whether the passage of the MCA was a violation of the

166. Id. at 277. In support of this proposition, Kennedy cited to a group of cases decided at the turn of
the 20th century collectively known as the Insular Cases. Id. (citing Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244
(1901); Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197 (1903); Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138 (1904); and Balzac
v. Puerto Rico, 258 U.S. 298 (1922)). The Insular Cases generally stand for the proposition that full
constitutional rights only apply to incorporated territories, but in unincorporated territories, “fundamental”
constitutional rights could apply depending on an objective determination of the level and character of
control asserted there by the United States. See Wilson, supra note 61, at 169 n.19. These cases thus
support Justice Kennedy’s broad proposition in Vergugo-Urquidez that the proper test for constitutional
protection of aliens abroad is not a strict territorial rule, but rather a case-by-case consideration of the
circumstances of the authority asserted by the United States in a given situation. See id. at 169.
167. Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 483 n.15 (2004).
168. See Wilson, supra note 61, at 171; see also Hafetz, supra note 3, at 138-39.
169. See In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d 443, 463 (D.D.C. 2005). The district court
judge explained:
[R]ather than citing to Eisentrager or even the portion of Verdugo-Urquidez that referenced
the “emphatic” inapplicability of the Fifth Amendment to aliens outside U.S. territory, the
Rasul Court specifically referenced . . . Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion. . . . This
Court therefore interprets that portion of the opinion to require consideration of that
precedent in the determination of the underlying rights of the detainees.
Id.
170. Rasul, 542 U.S. at 476.
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Suspension Clause. As discussed previously, Supreme Court in Swain recognized that
a congressional act that limited formal habeas rights but provided an “adequate” or
“effective” substitute would not run afoul of the Suspension Clause.171 However, as
the dissent in Boumediene recognized, a close analysis of remedies provided to the
Guantanamo detainees by the DTA and the MCA reveals that these statutory schemes
fall woefully short of this standard.172
The Court has recognized that “[t]he writ of habeas corpus is the fundamental
instrument for safeguarding individual freedom against arbitrary and lawless state
action,”173 and that “[p]etitioners in habeas corpus proceedings . . . are entitled to
careful consideration and plenary processing of their claims including full opportunity
for presentation of the relevant facts.”174 Indeed, the Court has made clear that “[t]he
whole history of the writ—its unique development—refutes a construction of the
federal courts’ habeas corpus powers that would assimilate their task to that of courts
of appellate review,” and “the power of inquiry on federal habeas corpus is plenary.”175
Held against these principles, the judicial review afforded by the DTA can hardly
be said to be “adequate” or “effective” substitutes for habeas. The DTA grants the
D.C. Circuit “exclusive jurisdiction to determine the validity of any final decision of
a Combatant Status Review Tribunal that an alien is properly detained as an enemy
combatant.”176 Such review is limited in scope to two specific inquiries, each of which
in turn reveals the immense and ultimately unconstitutional gap between such review
and the traditional protections of habeas corpus.
First, the court may consider whether the CSRT complied with its own standards
and procedures, “including the requirement that the conclusion of the Tribunal be
supported by a preponderance of the evidence and allowing a rebuttable presumption
in favor of the Government’s evidence.”177 An analysis of the underlying CSRT
procedures178 reveals that such an inquiry is far from the traditional protections
afforded by habeas. As the Boumediene dissent noted, under the CSRT process, “[t]he
detainee need not be informed of the basis for his detention (which may be classified),
need not be allowed to introduce rebuttal evidence (which is sometimes deemed by the
CSRT too impractical to acquire), and must proceed without the benefit of his own
counsel.”179 Indeed, the Government’s most recent interpretation of the proper
standard of review for the D.C. Circuit in undertaking CSRT review asserted that the
court should limit its inquiry to “whether the CSRT ‘had enough information before’
it to conclude that the detainee is an enemy combatant, without judging the quality of
that evidence.”180 Based on these standards, a finding that the CSRT complied with its

171. Swain v. Pressley, 430 U.S. 372, 381 (1977); see also discussion supra Part II.A.
172. Boumediene v. Bush, 476 F.3d 981, 1004-07 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (Rogers, J., dissenting).
173. Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 290-91 (1969).
174. Id. at 298.
175. Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 311-12 (1963).
176. Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, § 1005(e)(2)(A), 119 Stat. 2680, 2742.
177. Id. § 1005(e)(2)(C)(i).
178. See supra notes 62-65 and accompanying text.
179. Boumediene v. Bush, 476 F.3d 981, 1005 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
180. Corrected Brief for Respondent Addressing Pending Preliminary Motions at 26, Bismullah v. Gates,
No. 06-1197 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 10, 2007) (quoting People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran v. U.S. Dep’t of
State, 182 F.3d 17, 25 (D.C. Cir. 2003). The Government further asserted, based on the clear
pronouncement in Boumediene that the Constitution does not apply to the Guantanamo detainees, that there
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own heavily weighted standards and supported its decision by a preponderance of
evidence largely supplied by the Government is hardly the searching inquiry into
contested Executive detention that habeas requires.
Second, the D.C. Circuit is permitted, under the DTA, to consider “to the extent
the Constitution and laws of the United States are applicable, whether the use of such
standards and procedures to make the determination is consistent with the Constitution
and laws of the United States.”181 However, as Justice Breyer noted in his dissent from
the Court’s initial denial of certiorari in Boumediene, the court of appeals there
“expressly indicated that no constitutional rights . . . extend to the Guantanamo
detainees,” thus rendering this statutory provision “a nullity.”182 Based on the holding
of Boumediene, Justice Breyer stressed that “[i]t is unreasonable to suggest that the
D.C. Circuit in future proceedings under the DTA will provide review that affords
petitioners the rights that the Circuit has already concluded they do not have.”183
The recent decision of Bismullah v. Gates184 exemplifies Justice Breyer’s concerns.
In Bismullah, the D.C. Circuit for the first time attempted to discern the specific
procedures and precise scope of review of CSRT determinations under the DTA.185
Bound by the Boumediene decision, the court did not address constitutional ramifications
of the CSRT process, and was left only to consider whether such determinations were
made consistently with the standards and procedures set forth by the Executive.186
Bismullah held that the proper record of review in such proceedings “consists of all the
information a [CSRT] is authorized to obtain and consider” and not, as the Government
urged, only that information actually presented to the CSRT panel.187 The court defined
the authorized information according to the CSRT rules as laid out by the Secretary of
Defense, specifically “such reasonably available information in the possession of the
U.S. Government bearing on the issue of whether the detainee meets the criteria to be
designated as an enemy combatant,” including “any information presented to the Tribunal
by the detainee or his Personal Representative.”188
While the Bismullah court thus allowed a court conducting a CSRT review under
the DTA to examine all of the evidence collected by the government, it expressly refused the detainees request for additional discovery as part of the D.C. Circuit review.189

is no Sixth Amendment right to counsel or Fifth Amendment Due Process rights applicable to the
underlying CSRT procedures. Id. at 24.
181. Detainee Treatment Act § 1005(e)(2)(C)(ii) (emphasis added).
182. Boumediene v. Bush, 127 S. Ct. 1478, 1480 (2007) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
183. Id.
184. Bismullah v. Gates, Nos. 06-1197, 06-1397, 2007 WL 2067938 (D.C. Cir. July 20, 2007).
185. In its grant of certiorari in Boumediene, the Supreme Court noted that “it would be of material
assistance to consult” Bismullah, which was then pending in the D.C. Circuit. Boumediene v. Bush, 127
S. Ct. 3078, 3078 (2007).
186. Bismullah, 2007 WL 2067938, at *7 (“[O]ur jurisdiction under the Act is expressly ‘limited to the
consideration of’ whether a detainee’s status determination was ‘consistent with the standards and
procedures specified by the Secretary of Defense for [a CSRT].’” (quoting DTA § 1005(e)(2)(C)(i), 119
Stat. at 2742)).
187. Id. at *1.
188. Id. (emphasis added).
189. Id. at *7-*8. The court did not entirely foreclose the possibility of additional discovery, holding
only that the particular detainees before them did not make “a showing sufficient to justify compelling
discovery at this stage of these proceedings.” Id. at *7.
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As the concurrence in Bismullah indicated, relying on the record as so defined
“reinforce[s] concerns about the adequacy of actions under the DTA as a substitute for
the writ of habeas corpus.”190 Specifically, the concurrence noted that the CSRT
procedures required a detainee to identify and present to the Tribunal exculpatory
evidence without any assistance of counsel and without access to classified information
being used to form the case against him.191 Perhaps more importantly, limiting the
record to “reasonably available information in the possession of the U.S. Government”
allows for unilateral control of that record by the Executive branch, as determinations
of precisely what is “reasonably available” rest with the Recorder responsible for
compiling the evidence.192
The Bismullah decision makes clear the impact of the court of appeals decision
in Boumediene. In holding that the Guantanamo detainees possess no constitutional
rights, the Boumediene majority ensured that any CSRT review pursuant to the DTA
will involve only a determination, based on a potentially incomplete record, that the
CSRT played by its own established rules. Such a narrow review offers little
opportunity for a detainee, represented by counsel for the first time before the D.C.
Circuit, to adequately contest the legality of his confinement. In short, such review can
hardly be construed as an adequate substitute for habeas corpus.
V. CONCLUSION
The majority in Boumediene erred in its consideration of the Guantanamo
detainees’ underlying rights to habeas corpus. By relying heavily on the requirement
of sovereign jurisdiction as a condition precedent for constitutional protection
espoused in Eisentrager, the court largely ignored the considerable language of Rasul
that diminished such bright-line determinations as applied to the detainees. Moreover,
by invoking a strict territorial analysis, the majority failed to consider whether the
passage of the MCA was void as an unconstitutional suspension of the writ of habeas
corpus. Both the dissent in Boumediene and the district court in In re Guantanamo
Detainee Cases viewed the issue through the proper lens and, as a result, called for a
consideration of the detainees’ habeas petitions on the merits, something that the
Supreme Court mandated over two years ago in Rasul and which has yet to proceed.
Considering the grievous errors of the Boumediene majority and the hasty and
ultimately unconstitutional actions of Congress in enacting the MCA,193 the Supreme
Court should clarify its reasoning in Rasul and overturn the Boumediene decision.
Given the limited and unsatisfactory statutory remedies made available to the detainees

190. Id. at *15.
191. Id. at *14.
192. Id.; see also CSRT Order, supra note 4, at 2 (“The Tribunal, through its Recorder, shall have
access to and consider any reasonably available information generated in connection with the initial
determination to hold the detainee as an enemy combatant . . . as well as any reasonably available records,
determinations, or reports generated in connection therewith.”).
193. Some members of Congress have already begun efforts to undo the effects of the MCA. For
example, on January 16, 2007, Senator Arlen Spector introduced the “Habeas Corpus Restoration Act of
2007,” which would effectively repeal all of the jurisdiction stripping language inserted into the federal
habeas statute by the MCA. S. 185, 110th Cong. (2007); see also S. 1876, 110th Cong. § 301 (2007)
(striking subsection (e) of 28 U.S.C. § 2241 and expressly granting the District Court for the District of
Columbia jurisdiction to hear habeas claims of detainees determined to be enemy combatants).
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by Congress under the DTA and the MCA, anything less will only further allow the
Government to avoid its duty to defend its detention decisions before a federal court.
Furthermore, a failure by the Supreme Court to forcefully weigh in on the issues at
hand will only serve to lengthen the imprisonment of the Guantanamo detainees, which
for some has endured for over five years, without any meaningful opportunity to
contest the validity of their confinement. Boumediene stands as an important flashpoint in the ongoing struggle to define the rights of the Guantanamo detainees, and as
such it offers the Court an opportunity to remove from Guantanamo Bay the dubious
label,“legal black hole.”

